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TOWARD A FORMATIVE PROJECT OF SECURING
FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
Linda C. McClaint

INTRODUCrION

This Symposium offers an occasion to pursue two important
tasks: (1) identifying normative and constitutional foundations for an
affimnative governmental responsibility to engage in a "formative project" that would foster persons' capacities for democratic and personal
self-government;' and (2) exploring the mix of normative and empirical inquiries necessary to shape the proper goals and parameters of
such a project. These tasks are relevant to my larger project of attempting to develop a synthetic, or feminist and liberal, normative account of rights, responsibilities, and governmental promotion of
good, self-governing lives. 2 That account argues for governmental responsibility to foster the preconditions for securing free and equal citizenship for all. It would make the issue of sex inequality, or women's
subordination, a central concern of law and political philosophy, and
would also attend to other systemic, unjust forms of subordination.
This approach would also endorse liberal commitments to autonomy,
toleration, and respect for diversity, and would find a place for civic
republican concerns to foster the capacity for democratic selfgovernment.
t Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law;, Faculty Fellow in Ethics,
Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. I presented earlier
versions of this Article at the Cornell Law School Symposium, Discriminationand Inequality:
Emerging Issues, at a faculty workshop at Boston University School of Law;, at the Feminism
and Legal Theory Project's Workshop on Discriminationand Inequality, held at Cornell Law
School; and at the Georgetown-Maryland/PEGS Discussion Group on Constitutional Law's
How Empirical Should ConstitutionalTheory Be, held at Georgetown University Law Center.
Thanks to the participants and to Jim Fleming for helpful comments. I would also like to
thank Hofstra University and Harvard University for generous research support.
1 See MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMocRAcy's DiscoNTENT 6, 319-24 (1996). This notion of
a formative project draws upon Michael Sandel's discussion of "a formative politics" that
"cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires." Id. at 6.
2
In another article, I gave content to promoting good lives in terms of promoting
capacities for self-government, so that good lives are, in an important sense, self-governing
ones. See Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and GovernmentalPromotion of GoodLives:
Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect; 59 OHIo ST. LJ. 19 (1998). I suggested
affinities between my own approach and certain prominent strands of liberal, feminist, and
civic republican thought concerning the responsibilities of government to undertake a
formative project. See id. passim.
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Civic republican theorist Michael Sandel employs the term "formative project" and speaks of a "formative politics" as "a politics that
cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires."3 Although this might imply that civic education is the primary aim of such a project, he also calls for greater attention to "the
political economy of citizenship," which focuses on the kinds of economic arrangements that are hospitable to self-government. 4
Although I draw on this civic republican conception of a formative
project, I also seek to develop a synthetic account that employs important liberal and feminist conceptions of such a project. Similarly, I
seek to develop a more explicitly feminist conception of political
economy of citizenship than Sandel does, one that puts gender, and
its intersection with race and class, at the center of analysis. Nonetheless, this civic republican recognition of public responsibility to foster
self-government, including economic arrangements conducive to such
self-government, serves as a useful starting point for a more capacious
notion of a formative project.
This Article initiates an exploration of this project via three avenues of inquiry. Part I considers the "empirical turn" in recent legal
scholarship, exemplified in the work of Chief Judge Richard Posner.
This trend is quite relevant to the investigation in light of persistent
feminist critiques of a lack of empiricism in constitutional law and theory specifically, as well as in law generally. This Part also examines
what one can learn about the proper aims and contours of a formative
project through a brief survey of some persisting problems of inequality, as diagnosed in familiar feminist critiques of equality doctrine and,
more generally, constitutional law.
Part II canvasses promising sources for grounding a formative
project, including strands of constitutional theory that suggest that
the Constitution authorizes a formative project. Part Ill situates the
call for a formative project in the specific context of economic inequality and the persisting poverty of women and children. Here, it
evaluates two helpful and strikingly divergent arguments for public
responsibility to address such inequality: Bruce Ackerman and Anne
Alstott's new book, The Stakeholder Society,5 and Martha Fineman's re6
cent work on rewriting the social contract.
3

SANDEL, supra note 1, at 6, 319-24.

4

Id. at 125.

5

BRUCE AcKERmAN & ANNE ALsroTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCMIEY (1999).

6 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Crackingthe FoundationalMyths: Independence,Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 8 Am.U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000) [hereinafter Fineman,
FoundationalMyths]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability ofDependency and the Politics
of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89 (1998); Martha Albertson Fineman, What Placefor
Family Privacy2, 67 GEO. WASH. L. R,.1207 (1999) [hereinafter Fineman, Family Privacy];
see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FiNEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
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I select these two examples because they suggest some of the resources for fashioning a formative project that are available in feminist, liberal, and civic republican thought. Read together, these
works' respective strengths and weaknesses highlight difficult issues
warranting further attention: (1) the interplay between independence
and dependency, and between personal and public responsibility; and
(2) the challenge of embracing both a strong principle of governmental noninterference in people's lives to secure their autonomy and
equality, as well as a strong principle of affirmative governmental responsibility to secure those goods. In this respect, these proposals
point to vital elements in a formative project to secure equality and
self-government in a pluralistic constitutional democracy. This Article
does not attempt to resolve important and inevitable questions of institutional design, such as how best to design or to rethink social institutions to carry out a formative project and how best to enlist various
levels, branches, and tools of government to do so. 7 This project
should be done in a careful, contextual way. As with the other types of
difficult questions that this Article addresses, these queries invite various types of empirical inquiry and call for normative judgments or,
contra Richard Posner, "theory."
I
THE "EMnelCAL TuRN," FEMINIST CRIQUES,
FORMATIVE PROJECr

AND A

The "empirical turn" in recent legal scholarship has received considerable publicity and attention in light of Chief Judge Richard Posner's recent calls for the turn to natural and social science in
constitutional adjudication, and his provocative assertion that moral
theory has "nothing to offer law."8 He has urged constitutional theorists, and the legal profession as a whole, to redirect their attention to
a "more fruitful" endeavor: "exploring the operation and consequences of constitutionalism," such as by studying the difference various constitutional doctrines make in practice, as well as the impact of
"intrusive judicial review" on legislators. 9 Posner suggests that these
professionals "redirect [their] research and teaching efforts toward
fuller participation in the enterprise of social science, and by doing
OTHER TWENIErH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing for society's protection and subsi-

dization of caregiving).
7
For a helpful survey of the current literature on theories of "institutional design,"
see Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and TheirDesign, in THE THEORY OF INSTTUInoNAL DESIGN
1 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996).
8 Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARv. L. REv.
1637, 1698 (1998). Posner has published this article in book form. See RiCHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMATIcs OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
9 Richard A. Posner, Against ConstitutionalTheory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1998).
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this make social science a better aid to judges' understanding of the
social problems that get thrust at them in the form of constitutional
issues." 10 Although differing from Posner in recognizing the impossibility of separating normative and empirical inquiry, Michael Doff recently echoed Posner in his call for the Supreme Court to "[e]xplicitly
pay[ I greater attention to the likely consequences of its decisions and
to the empirical assumptions underlying its doctrines.""
The charge of a lack of empiricism is a persistent theme in feminist critiques of constitutional law and theory.' 2 These critiques target
not only specific constitutional doctrines and rights, but also liberal
constitutionalism's general assumptions about the self and the possibility of self-government. These works raise many questions, including the role that "facts" about sex and gender have played in
constitutional adjudication about sex equality itself, such as the equal
protection doctrine, as well as about other matters implicating sex
equality, such as the scope of due process liberty or First Amendment
freedoms. They also question how attentive jurists and constitutional
theorists have been to empirical questions about sex inequality, and
the consequences of specific legal doctrines and the delineation of
rights and responsibilities. How do self-government and related notions of autonomy and responsibility feature in persons' conceptions
of a good life for them?
A number of arguably empirical questions are of central concern
to my project. For example, what are the preconditions for meaningful democratic and personal self-government? How might government play a role in fostering those preconditions? Do our current
conceptions of constitutional rights and responsibilities adequately
support such a formative project? What are the residual effects of historical forms of legally sanctioned discrimination, unjust social hierarchies, or caste systems upon the ability of members within targeted
groups to engage in meaningful self-government 13 and to exercise
10 Id. at 12 & n.20. One of Posner's targets in that essay is Ronald Dworkin. See id. at
7 (referring to Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIz. ST. LJ. 353 (1997)).
11 Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of SocraticDeliberation, 112 Hiv. L. REv. 4, 8 (1998) (arguing that the common law method of adjudicia-

tion "is an increasingly ineffective means" of addressing the problems of a rapidly changing
world).
12 See infraPart I.A.
13 I am thinking here, for example, of Cass Sunstein's articulation of an anti-caste
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and ofJack Balkin's and Reva Siegel's work
on caste and status hierarchies. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTLa' CONSTITUTON 338-46
(1993); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2353-58 (1997); Reva
Siegel, Why EqualProtection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-EnforcingState Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1143-48 (1997). Feminist theory stressing an antisubordination
principle is also relevant. See, e.g., RuTH CoL.ER, ABORTION & DALOGUE 83-92 (1992) (advancing a group-based antisubordination approach to reproductive health issues); CATHA-
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what Peggy Davis describes as a right to participate in civil society? 14
Do the constitutional protections of freedom of association and privacy foster a healthy civil society in which diverse conceptions of the
good life may flourish, even as associations serve as "seedbeds of virtue" and inculcate democratic habits and values? Or do these protections immunize from governmental regulation a realm of private
power that often hinders persons' self-constitution and allows such
vices as intolerance, localism, and groupism to flourish? 15
In addition to these empirical questions, related interpretive and
normative inquiries exist What are the best theoretical justifications
for an account of constitutional law that authorizes governmental attention to eradicating or ameliorating the residual effects of discrimination? To the extent that ongoing discrimination and unjust social
hierarchies threaten the well-being and the capacity for self-development of members of certain groups, what constitutional theories sustain or challenge a governmental attack on those obstacles to full
citizenship? What sort of approach protects civil society as an important realm of self-constitution, freedom of association, and public deliberation, while also sufficiently regulating civil society to ensure that
it does not unduly hinder persons' self-constitution and that it supports important public values, at least to some degree and in some of
its forms?
This Article argues for governmental responsibility to undertake
a formative project to secure free and equal citizenship, which seems
to follow as an appropriate solution to lingering problems of
inequality.
A.

Posner's Empiricism Versus Feminist Empiricism

This nation has suffered from "a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination"' 6 and sex inequality. Interpretations of the Constitution based on putative "facts" about the respective capacities and
roles of men and women have perpetuated this inequality. In light of
this history, one should not be surprised that, like Posner, a number
of feminist legal thinkers have critiqued the relationship between empiricism and constitutional law and theory.
RINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 225, 232-34, 248-49 (1989)

(exploring how contemporary notions of equality perpetuate historical disparities).
14

See PEcxy COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES 234-38 (1997). But see Katherine M.

Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 10
YALEJ.L. & HumAN.251, 251-58 (1999) (arguing that newly freed slaves' right to marry was
an important aspect of freedom and acceptance into civil society, but came at a cost because of its disciplining and regulating effects).
15 For consideration of these questions, see Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming,
Some Questionsfor Civil Societ,-Revivalists, 75 CHi.-KxENT L.REv. 301 (2000).
16 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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There are two distinct forms of this feminist critique. The first
form targets the U.S. Supreme Court's use of supposed "facts" about
men and women tojustify similar or different treatment. This critique
is especially apt with respect to the Court's early equal protection jurisprudence about sex. Familiar examples of this use of "facts" include Justice Bradley's appeal to the law of nature and the Creator to
define women's proper role and destiny in his concurrence in
Bradwell v. Illinois17 and the Court's assumptions about the disabling
18
effects of women's physiology and maternity in Muller v. Oregon.
This critique also targets the Court's acceptance of legislative generalizations about sex differences, proper gender roles, and women's special domestic responsibilities, despite contemporary "facts" or social
science evidence to the contrary.' 9
Language about the need to be vigilant against using archaic stereotypes about women and men to justify discriminatory governmental regulation accompanied the Court's shift from rational-basis
scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny of gender classifications. The requirement articulated in both Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan20 and United States v. Virginia2 l (VM) that government offer an
"'exceedingly persuasive justification'"22 for sex-based treatment suggests to some commentators and members of the Court that the standard of review may be moving toward strict scrutiny. 23 Despite this
17
18

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).

19 We can find an example of this use of unsubstantiated evidence in Goesaertv. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948), overded by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This case upheld the
exclusion of women from bartending, except wives and daughters of male owners, on the
rationale that bartending by women may "give rise to moral and social problems." Id. at
465-66. Notwithstanding "the vast changes in the social and legal position of women," the
Court stated: "The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight,
or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest
scientific standards." Id. at 466. For an example of an appeal to women's "special" domestic responsibilities, see Hoyt v. lorida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Court there referred to the legislature's concern for women's
"special responsibilities" as affording a reasonable justification for an absolute exemption
of all women from jury duty, unless they register a desire to be placed on the jury list. Id. at
62. The Court also noted that "[d] espite the enlightened emancipation of women from
the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life."
20 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
21 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
22 Id. at 524 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
23 See, e.g., Carrie Corcoran, Comment, Single-Sex Education After VMI: Equal Protection
and East Harlem's Young Women's Leadership School 145 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 1009-11 (1997).
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's use and application of the phrase
"exceedingly persuasivejustification" indicated that it in effect had adopted a strict scrutiny
standard. See V1MI, 518 U.S. at 573-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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move toward stricter scrutiny, members of the Court have continued
to struggle over the distinction between real differences between the
sexes, which might justify sex-based regulation, and differences that
are the product of broad generalizations, for which the government
24
has failed to establish an empirical foundation.
This territory is likely familiar to most participants in and readers
of this Symposium and is the subject of extensive feminist commentary. Thus, I shall discuss only briefly the role of "facts" about sameness and difference in equal protection jurisprudence. Several
comments, however, are appropriate to distinguish Posner's proposed
empirical approach to such questions from feminist critiques and current equal protection jurisprudence, and to suggest that a turn to
greater empiricism should not follow Posner's lead in these respects.
First, although Posner claims to eschew any normative framework
in his approach to adjudication, his method appears to be a "Darwinian pragmatism"

25

that judges societal practices by the criterion of

"adapt[abilityl to any plausible or widely accepted need of the societies in question. '26 Alternatively, his approach may be an "amoral instrumentalism." 2 7 Thus, taking up the VM! Court's cautionary
chronicle of now-repudiated historical practices rooted in assumptions about sex differences, Posner chides the Court for its air of
moral superiority.2 8 He suggests that if the Court were less ignorant
of history, it would see that this history not only explains those practices, but may also justify them. 29 Additionally, Posner strongly rebukes the Court for ignoring evolutionary biology, its lessons about

24 Compare VMI, 518 U.S. at 540-42, 549-51 (finding no differences between the sexes
sufficient to justify a state-funded all-male educational facility), with id. at 565 (Rehnquist,
CJ., concurring) (entertaining the possibility that sufficient differences between the sexes
exist tojustify state-funded all-male educational facilities), and id. at 576-79, 585-86 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (asserting differences sufficient tojustify a state-funded all-male educational
facility). Consider also the role that "differences" played in the Court's earlier upholding
of the male-only selective-service registration in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76-81
(1981), and of the gender-based statutory rape law in MichaelM.v. Superior Cour4 450 U.S.
464,468-73 (1981). Similar issues arise in Title Vlljurisprudence. For example, in Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court accepted "a bona fide occupational qualification" defense as supporting the exclusion of women from employment as prison guards in
a maximum-security prison. Id. at 335-37. According to the Court, a woman's "very womanhood," id. at 336, would diminish her ability to maintain order because male inmates,
"deprived of a normal heterosexual environment, would assault women guards because
they were women," id. at 335.
25
I borrow this term from Ronald Dworkin, Darwin'sNew Bulldog 111 HARv. L. Rxv.
1718, 1736 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26
Posner, supra note 8, at 1652.
27
Doff, supra note 11, at 81.
28
See Posner, supra note 9, at 14.
29
See id. at 13-14.

1228

CORNELL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 85:1221

real differences between the sexes, and the import of these differences for sex-segregated versus integrated military education.3 0
Applying his utilitarian calculus, Posner seriously doubts that excluding women from the Virginia Military Institute would have any
nontrivial negative effects on their equality, but suggests that including women could produce considerable negative effects on the school.
This calculus readily sacrifices the opportunities of the "exceptional"
women who could flourish at the Virginia Military Institute in light of
the assumed greater harm from their inclusion. Here Posner clearly
disagrees with certain normative principles underlying equal protectionjurisprudence: (1) the state bears the burden ofjustifying a classification based on sex and (2) individuals should be judged on their
own merits, and generalizations or stereotypes about the sexes, even if
true in many or most cases, fail to justify restricting opportunities for
those who do not fit the generalization.3 '
Second, another troubling aspect of Posner's approach, which
sharply contrasts with feminist theorizing about equality, is its truncated conception of the possibility of critiqing social practices. Repudiating moral theory as a ground for criticizing such practices because
of the persistence of moral disagreement and suggesting that arguing
over ends rather than means is futile, Posner nonetheless asserts that
scholars can play a role in critiquing practices that "lack functionality,
instrumental efficiency, or rationality."3 2 Upon a first reading, Posner's ideas might seem to have some critical force and might even
appear to dovetail with both feminist critiques of patriarchy and some
of the Court's equal protection decisions of the 1970s. Feminist litigators at that time patiently helped the Court to see that certain practices lacked rationality and were instead rooted in archaic stereotypes
3o

See id. at 12-19. But see Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, HistoricalNarratives and

Social Science Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S.

CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 189, 301, 308-09 (1996) (reporting Carol NagyJacklin's expert

testimony that there is "no evidence that the adversative model is better for males or for
females" and that "[t] here are many different kinds of learning but in all of those different
kinds of learnings no sex differences have been found").
31 As Deborah Merritt argues, Posner's real objection to the VM case is not that the
opinion lacks any grounding in empirical reality-for he ignores the extent to which the
courts in VMT considered some of the empirical concerns he articulates-but that the
Court's normative theory of equal protection differs from his. See Deborah Jones Merritt,
ConstitutionalFact and Theory: A Response to Chiefjudge Posner,97 MicH. L. Ray. 1287, 1288-90
(1999). In this Symposium, Mary Anne Case argues that the real "rule" at work in VMand in the Court's other equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifications-is not the intermediate scrutiny test, but an anti-stereotyping jurisprudence that
centers on a search for perfect proxies (i.e., for a sex-respecting classification to stand, "the
assumption at the root of the sex-respecting rule must be true of either all women or no
women or all men or no men"). Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns":
ConstitutionalSex Discriminationas a Questfor Perfect Proxies,85 CoNEnLL L. Rxv. 1447, 144950 (2000).
32
Posner, supra note 8, at 1668.
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about the sexes. 33 These decisions, however, deviate from Posner's
notion of functional critique, because they hold that efficiency, or administrative convenience, will not suffice to immunize discriminatory
34
practices from constitutional critique.
Moreover, the shift to intermediate scrutiny ensures that mere
rationality will not suffice to justify a practice. Were these practices
"adaptive" with respect to the needs of the society in question? They
undoubtedly were, assuming one accepts as the benchmark the perpetuation of a society whose practices are rooted in patriarchy-male
authority and dominance in the legal and political spheres, and in the
family. The argument in the oft-quoted concurrence in Bradwell v.
Illinois,35 which invokes the natural and divine order to explain and
justify sex-based restrictions in employment, is a prime example of the
argument that laws perpetuating patriarchy are adaptive. 36 If a few
exceptional women tried to defy these natural and divinely-ordained
constraints, the needs of society were to prevail. Contemporary constitutional jurisprudence gives less credence to appeals to preserve the
status quo, especially when the status quo reflects a legacy of sex-based
discrimination and when legal measures upholding it may perpetuate
37
such discrimination.
Posner's "functional criticism" lacks critical bite precisely because
one needs to ask: Adaptive from whose point of view? And from what
normative conception of the ends of society? Of marriage? Of the
family? Contrary to Posner, we should not and cannot eschew moral
theory in assessing questions of the "adaptiveness" of institutional
practices.
33 See Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the FeministLegal
Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 14-18 (stating that, before the Court could
turn away from existing precedent, it "needed basic education" and that the objective in
the litigation strategy pursued by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in connection with the ACLU Women's Rights Project was to "obtain thoughtful consideration of the assumptions underlying, and the purposes served by, sex-based classifications").
34 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (striking down, under a rational basis
test, a statutory preference for male administrators of the estates and rejecting an administrative convenience rationale for the preference).
35
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
36
See id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
37
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (expressing skepticism
about the Virginia Military Institute's claims that admitting women would destroy the institution, in light of the history of similar claims about the dangers of integration of women
into other educational and professional fields from which they were previously excluded);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992) (plurality opinion) (striking
down the husband-notification provision of an abortion statute and observing that, while
such a provision may reflect an earlier, common-law understanding of husbands' prerogatives during marriage, this notion is offensive to present understandings of women's constitutional liberty); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (striking down a provision
of Louisiana's community property law that gave a husband, as " ' head and master" of the
community property, the right to dispose of that property without his wife's consent).
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Third, it is also a dangerous dead end to think that if we turn to a
field like evolutionary biology to assess sex differences and sex-based
regulation, as Posner invites us to do,38 we can avoid moral theory or
normative judgment. A turn to this field of inquiry creates the problem that gender-role expectations will color scientists' "findings"
about the sexes. 39 But, even more troubling, the risk exists of blurring
the distinction between "is" and "ought" and of not simply explaining,
but excusing or legitimating men's recourse to such "adaptive" and
"rational" tactics as rape, 4° confining and policing women's sexuality,
38 See Posner, supra note 8, at 1646 (commending evolutionary biology as a "successful" natural science that is "both beautiful and useful").
39 For example, female (feminist) scientists have brought important criticism to bear
on the evolutionary biology model of the promiscuous, aggressive male and the coy, choosy
female and on other assumptions about male and female roles. See, e.g., SARAH BEAmrR
HRDy, THE WOMAN THAT NEVER EVOLVED (1981); MEREDITH F. SMALL, FEMALE CHOICES

(1993).
40 A recent, controversial book offers an evolutionary biology explanation for the
cause of rape and illustrates some of the problems mentioned in the text. See RANDY
THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASIs OF SEXuAL
COERCION (2000). Thornhill and Palmer argue that the "ultimate causes of human rape
are clearly found in the distinctive evolution of male and female sexuality," that is, the
"different adaptations of male and female sexuality that were formed by selection in
human evolutionary history." Id. at 84. Specifically, they claim:

The evidence demonstrates that rape has evolved as a response to the
evolved psychological mechanisms regulating female sexuality, which enabled women to discriminate among potential sex partners. If human females had been selected to be willing to mate with any male under any
circumstances, rape would not occur. On the other hand, if human males
had been selected to be sexually attracted to only certain females under
certain limited circumstances, rape would be far less frequent. Indeed, if
human males had been selected to desire sexual intercourse only with females who showed unmistakable willingness to copulate with them, rape

would be an impossibility.
Id.
It is undeniable that men use sexual coercion against women, and this may even be a
behavior with evolutionary roots, but the authors' remarkable conclusion implies that any
man who does not rape manages not to do so only by resisting what he has been selected to

do. This suggests that according respect to women's sexual agency simply goes against
men's "nature." It also demands an explanation of why most men do not rape. Moreover,
the authors draw heavily upon their research on male scorpionflies, who have a "notal
organ" that appears to be specifically designed for rape, and they search for psychological

mechanisms in human males analogous to this organ. Id. at 63-66. One prominent evolutionary biologist criticized Thornhill and Palmer's work as "irresponsible," "tendentious,"
and "sloppy." Erica Goode, What Provokes a Rapist to Rape? Scientists Debate Notion of an
EvolutionayDrive, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 15, 2000, at B9 (quoting Dr. Jerry Coyne of the University of Chicago). In another review, one scientist faulted its simplistic use of the idea of

"adaptation" as seriously ignoring that "[w]e [have] evolved a complex mental life that

makes us act in all sorts of ways" and as attempting to focus just on one possible reproduc-

tive strategy. Frans B. M. de Waal, Survival of the Rapist, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 2000, § 7 (Book
Review), at 24-25. Furthermore, Thornhill and Palmer draw sharp criticism from experts
on rape for their proposals to educate young women that dressing in a sexually attractive
manner may attract rapists and to educate young men concerning the need to resist their
sexually evolved desires to rape. See THORNHILL AND PALMER, supra at 179-83. For such
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domestic violence, and sexual harassment. 4 l Some evolutionary biologists chide feminists and their reform agenda for ignoring or denying
the truths of evolutionary biology. Yet when proponents of evolutionary biology attribute to it singularly powerful explanatory force, their
view presents the risk of blind acceptance of overly simplistic accounts
of harmful human behavior and prescriptions for its regulation, 42 and
may encourage pessimism or fatalism concerning the prospects for
such regulation.
In contrast to Posner's inadequate attention to point of view-or
rather, his adoption of the point of view of society's dominant interests-feminist theorists have forcefully argued for questioning and unmasking "neutrality" or "point of viewlessness" in politics and in law,
and for challenging whose interests are actually served. 43 As a feminist legal method, this approach is called "asking the 'woman question,'" and feminist scholars urge that it can be extended to ask more
generally about excluded and marginalized groups. 44 Catharine
MacKinnon is a preeminent advocate of this type of insistent uncriticisms, see, for example, Goode, supra at B9 (discussing views of Dr. Mary Koss of the
University of Arizona).
41
For Posner's own reliance upon evolutionary biology, see RaCHARD A. PosNER, Sax
AND REASON 88-98 (1992) (explaining how many customs by which men confine, sequester,
and control women are rational from the perspective of the male seeking to protect his
genetic investment). See also DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DEsn1E (1994) (offering an
account of reproductive strategies, discussing male jealousy as an adaptive strategy used to
control female partners and deter them from infidelity, and characterizing domestic violence as an extreme or pathological form of that strategy); ROBERT WRmr, THE MORAL
ANImAL 99-102 (1994) (suggesting that inequality among men leaves poorer men without
mates and more likely to resort to violence, theft, and rape). For popular press coverage of
evolutionary biology, see Natalie Angier, Raising Aggression to an Art Form, N.Y. TIMzs, Oct.
10, 1995, at C5 and Natalie Angier, Sexual Harassment:Why Even Bees Do I4 N.Y. TimEs, Oct.
10, 1995, at Cl. My point is not that evolutionary biologists defend these practices as morally good, but that, without critical attention to the question of point of view and to some
norms of equality and antisubordination, it is easy to commit the naturalistic fallacy and to
slip from explanation to justification, or to be skeptical about regulating the behavior because it is "natural."
Posner seems to suggest that moral critique is appropriate only when a practice is not
"adaptive," see supra text accompanying note 32, and this may be a move that is hardespecially for the nonscientist-to avoid. See, e.g., Courtney Weaver, Heartburn,N.Y. Tiaras,
Feb. 13, 2000, § 7 (Book Review), at 16 (suggesting the difficulty of trying not to move
from explaining behavior to excusing it once evolutionary psychologists characterize something like domestic violence as having an evolutionary function) (reviewing DAVID M. Buss,
THE DANGEROUS PASSION: WHY JEALOUSy Is AS NEcEssARY As LovF AND SEx (2000)). But
some proponents of evolutionary biology stress that human beings are potentially "moral"
animals and stress the need for strong moral codes. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra,at 344, 361-63.
42
See, e.g., THoRNHILL & PALMER, supra note 40, at 123-52 (attacking the "feminist
psychosocial analysis" of rape as erroneously viewing rape as culturally, rather than biologically, determined). For a discussion of the problems with their approach to rape and rape
prevention, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
43
See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 13, at 160-69.
44 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. Rxv. 829, 831, 83749
(1990).
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masking and curiously serves as Posner's leading example of contemporary and successful "moral entrepreneurship," whose rhetoric and
passion persuades people to change their ideas and behavior. 45
MacKinnon indicts norms and practices that have been "adaptive" for
patriarchy or "rational" from the standpoint of the ideology of male
supremacy or separate spheres, but that perpetuate the unequal treatment of women. 46 Calling for empirical investigation of the circumstances of women's lives, MacKinnon invites a focus upon the
construction of what "woman" means in a culture and upon the gen47
der-specific injuries women suffer because they are women.
Although she often denies that her project is about moralism or moral
theory rather than about equality under law, important principles of
political morality such as equal citizenship, the inviolability of persons,
and autonomy animate her work. 48
B.

Feminist Investigations of the Consequences of
Constitutionalism

The foregoing discussion leads to the second type of feminist
charge of a lack of empiricism: inattention to what Posner calls "the
operation and consequences of constitutionalism." 49 For example,
Posner questions the effects of having various constitutional doctrines,
"the actual and likely effects of particular decisions and doctrines,"
and the impact of active judicial review as opposed to judicial deference to legislatures. 50 In contrast to Posner, feminist theorists focus
on how this lack of empirical grounding serves to disempower women.
One claimed source of disempowerment is the structure of certain
constitutional rights themselves.
To take a familiar example, feminists often advance what I term
the "illusion" critique of rights: Constitutional theorists justify rights
Posner, supra note 8, at 1667.
See, e.g., MACKINNON, supranote 13, at 162 ("The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender-through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies."); id. at 215-34
(advancing a conception of gender as a system of social hierarchy, i.e., of inequality, and
arguing that prevailing equality doctrine fails to recognize how law legitimates women's
second class citizenship).
47 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, FromPractice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory].
For MacKinnon's application of this method to questions of global comparisons of women's condition and of the relevance of international human rights norms, see Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HuMAN RIGHTS 83 (Stephen Shute &
Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
48
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, "reedom from UnrealLoyalties" On Fidelity in ConstitutionalInterpretation,65 FoRnDw L. REv. 1773, 1774 (1997) (questioning the legitimacy
of a constitution in which women were not originally participants).
49
Posner, supranote 9, at 11.
50 Id. at 11-13.
45

46
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with universalist rhetoric about respect for personhood, privacy, and a
realm of personal autonomy. But these rights are an illusion for women, and the rhetoric masks the role of rights in disempowering women when government leaves people alone in their private lives. 5 1 In
other work, I disagree with this feminist critique of privacy to the extent that it suggests that the constitutional right of privacy, or a principle of toleration, sanctions private violence against women or bars
legal redress against such violence.5 2 I also indicate that grappling
with this critique leads to useful feminist reconstructive work on
53
privacy.
To what extent are such feminist critiques of liberal or mainstream constitutionalism themselves empirical? Some of MacKinnon's
critics contend that her claims about women's lives and experiences
are categorical and totalizing, subsume women into the category of
victim, and insufficiently address differences among women. 54 Yet a
persistent theme in her writing is that theory should proceed from the
ground up. Women's experiences of, and resistance to, sex inequality
give rise to theory about how patriarchy works, how male privilege
masquerades as point-of-viewlessness in law, and how laws systematically preserve men's entitlements and disempower women. 55 MacKinnon clearly presents her case as an empirical one, at least to the extent
that she accompanies her claims about the pervasiveness of sex ine51

See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93 (1987); Catharine A.

MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281 (1991) [hereinafter
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality].
52 See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the
Body, 7YALEJ.L. & HuMAN. 195, 241 (1995) ("[P]rotecting one location of inviolability, for
example, the home as castle, may have to yield to protecting another, a woman's body.");
McClain, supra note 2 (arguing for a more robust version of toleration in constitutional
interpretation). But I endorse the feminist critique of privacy to the extent that it correctly
indicts the historical use of such concepts as marital privacy rhetoric by courts and
lawmakers to shield the home from public exposure and to leave women without a remedy
against intimate violence. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove": Wife Beatingas Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
53 For my own approach, see Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasksfor a LiberalFeminist Conception of Privacy,40 Wm. & MARY, L. REv. 759 (1999) (endorsing and building upon
the liberal feminist conception advanced in Anita L. Allen, CoercingPrivacy,40 WM. & MARY
L. Ray. 723 (1999)). In ANITA L. ALLEN, UEawS" AccEss (1988), and in many publications
since then, Allen defends a liberal feminist conception of privacy, which squarely rejects
the misuses of the conception of privacy that MacKinnon, Siegel, and other feminists have
critiqued. See id. at 36. For a discussion of Martha Fineman's reconstructive work on family privacy, see infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialismin Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L
REv. 581, 585-86 (1990) (exposing the dangers of "gender essentialism" and introducing a
"multiple consciousness" theory).
55
See, e.g., MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 51, at 1282 (beginning
with the observation that "[e] quality was not mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights"); MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, supranote 47 (focusing on empirical studies
of women's lives and the gender-specific injuries women suffer).
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quality and the genesis of feminist resistance (and feminist theory)
with references to the prevalence of such phenomena as rape, domes56
tic violence, sexual harassment, and incest.
However, excluding for present purposes any problems with the
specifics of this presentation, interpretive moves still exist by necessity,
such as theorizing about the impact of male domination upon the
construction of women's self-definition or self-construction, upon
their desire, or upon the possibility of their sexual agency. 57 MacKin-

non's categorical claims about how society constructs women as sec56 This type of presentation is a staple feature of MacKinnon's work. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supranote 51, at 1293-94, 1301-03; MacKinnon, From Practice
to Theory, supra note 47, at 15.
57 A similar mixture of empirical and interpretive claims about women's lives and
experience attends MacKinnon's well-known writing and advocacy concerning pornography, in which she alleges serious problems of inattention to empirical reality by defenders
of the First Amendment against "censorship." See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY
WoRDs 22-23 (1993) (comparing pornography to racism and harassment); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 1, 1-2 (1985)
(defining pornography as a civil rights violation). Perhaps MacKinnon's most categorical
and interpretive claim-that pornography silences women and creates or perpetuates the
dynamic of sex inequality-is so hotly debated because it is the claim least amenable to
decisive empirical resolution. See C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1181, 1182 (1994) (book review) (characterizing MacKinnon's position that pornography silences women as her "most contentious position in recent years").
Does pornography impair women's ability to engage in democratic self-government?
Some prominent liberal constitutional theorists have wrestled with the "silencing" claim
and its normative implications, reaching different conclusions. See, e.g., RONALD DwORIN,
FREEDOM'S Lmw: THE MORAL READING OF THE AvmRcAN CONSTrUTION 238 (1996) (rejecting silencing argument because a constitutionally-protected right to try to influence the
moral environment does not include a right to be successful in influencing others or "a
right not to be insulted or damaged by the fact that others have hostile or uncongenial
tastes, or that they are free to express or indulge them in private"); SUNSrEIN, supra note

13, at 261-70 (defending argument for regulation of materials that combine sex with violence against women); id. at 394 n.14 (finding it plausible that pornography sometimes
plays a part in "silencing" women due to social attitudes, but that while the silencing argument is an important political argument against pornography, it should not be part of the
First Amendment argument because of the threat of "excessive inroads on a system of free
expression"); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: The Case of PornographyRegulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 295-97, 307-08 (1989) (discussing MacKinnon's silencing claim and critiquing American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid per cur., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), for disregarding the
"subversions of liberty and equal protection consequent upon a choice not to regulate");
Pornography: An Exchange,N.Y. REv. Booxs, Mar. 3, 1994, at 47 (letters by Catharine MacKinnon and Ronald Dworkin).
Additionally, does pornography's portrayal of sex so silence women that it renders a
"more speech" remedy ineffective? For example, notwithstanding (or perhaps building
on) her critique of a "porn-suppression" strategy because of the importance of
"[f]reewheeling [s]ex [t]alk," Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against PornSuppression, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1097, 1099-1101, 1134-35, 1146 (1994) (typeface altered), CarIin Meyer is exploring how these media constraints make such a "remedy" difficult and
problematic and subsequently calling upon feminists to turn their attention to the market.
See Carlin Meyer, Media, Markets and Women's Liberation: Enlarging the Feminist Agenda
(Nov. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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ond-class citizens and how women internalize this status invite
attention to the interplay between human agency and social structure.
Her claims thus offer an important resource for thinking about the
proper aims and contours of a formative project. At the same time, in
trying to work out these aims and contours in specific contexts, it is
important to pay heed to the multiple and overlapping forms of disadvantage and discrimination that women suffer and how specific policy
choices will affect differently situated women. 58
Feminists not only criticize mainstream jurisprudence and constitutionalism for inattention to the reality of sex inequality in specific
doctrinal areas, but also launch more global attacks on constitutional
theory and the Constitution itself for inattention to the differences in
women's and men's lives, experiences, values, needs, pleasures, and
pains. Institutional components of this argument also exist. For example, Mary Becker notes women's lack of representation not only in
the drafting of the Constitution but also in its interpretation, which is
largely in the hands of an overwhelmingly white male judiciary.5 9 She
provides prudential arguments against judicial review and in favor of
seeking equality through politics. 60 Additionally, Judith Baer charges
that equal protection with respect to sex-based classifications has done
more for men than for women and contends that "[t]oo often, 'you
can't get there (to a constitutional resolution of a woman's claim)
from here (a statement of the problem).' "61
Both Becker's and Baer's pessimism about the ability of the
courts to serve as helpful sources of securing sex equality stems in part
from concern forjudicial bias, which ensues because male judges look
at the world from a perspective held by men more than women and
issue legal rules better adapted to the needs of men than those of
women. 6 2 They are also concerned about judicial inattention to, and
ultimately the supposed doctrinal irrelevance of, differences in women's and men's lives, often rooted in the lingering effects of sex-role
socialization, unconscious discrimination, and the legacy of historic
58 For a critique of the single-axis analysis of discrimination and a call to put multiplyburdened women at the center of feminist analysis, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersectionof Race and Sex: A Black FeministCritiqueof AntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
59 See Mary Becker, ConservativeFree Speech and the Uneasy CaseforJudicialReview, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 975, 986-90 (1993).
60 See id. passim Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to FormalEquality and the Courts:An Argument for Pragmatismand Politics,40 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 209, 211 (1998); see also Mary E.
Becker, Prince Charming:AbstractEquality, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 201, 202 (arguing that women
should lobby for change rather than rely on courts to find one abstract standard to solve
women's problems).
61 JuDrrii A. BAER, OUR LIvEs BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST JuRISPRUDENCE 103 (1999).
62 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 59, at 986-90.
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discrimination. Although the democratic arena might appear to be a
better forum in which to pursue what Becker calls "the kind of experimentation necessary if we are ever to figure out either what equality
between the sexes might look like or how to get there," some formidable barriers to women's full and effective democratic participation still
remain. 63 Indeed, given this legacy of discrimination and marginalization, some political theorists argue that the underrepresentation of
women in legislatures is not "fair" representation and that groupbased remedies are necessary to enhance the representation of wo64
men and other historically marginalized groups.
Elsewhere I have taken a stand somewhat at odds with Becker's
viewpoint, criticizing arguments for judicial minimalism and greater
deference to the democratic process, while defending judicial enforcement of certain rights. 63 I do not attempt to resolve the debate
here. I recognize that good pragmatic and prudential reasons exist, as
well as arguments rooted in concerns for institutional design, to look
less frequently to courts and more often to legislatures to advance
constitutional norms of equality and liberty66 and to engage in the

kind of "democratic experimentalism" that multiple loci of decision
making and deliberation allow. 67 I nonetheless would favor a model

that recognizes that both the Legislature and the Executive are important constitutional actors responsible for enforcing the Constitution
but that courts play a necessary and proper role in upholding a uniform national regime with respect to certain rights. In this Article, I
wish to endorse Becker's insistence upon the importance of turning to
politics to secure gains in equality; as liberal feminist Wendy Williams
long ago admonished, "to the extent that the law of the public world
63 Id. at 990. Becker also has noted obstacles to women's full and effective political
participation, such as socialization, unconscious discrimination, the design of jobs for
workers with wives, and, perhaps most significant, problems rooted in relationships between women and men, such as the need to obscure the conflict between women and men.
See Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHL LEcAL F. 169.
64 See MELrSsA S. WuIIAMs, VoicE, TRUST, AND MEMoRY 3-22 (1998) (setting forth the
argument for enhanced representation for marginalized groups, including women and

African Americans).
65 SeeJames E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a SubstantiveRepublic, 76 Tax.
L. REv. 509,513-14, 538-48, 551 (1997) (reviewing CAss P, SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONI
AND
PouIcIAL CoNFLcIr (1996)) (criticizing Sunstein's "judicial minimalism").
66 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE (1991) (examiningjudicial progress in protecting civil rights, women's rights, and the environment); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 177-94 (1999) (advancing a "populist
constitutional law" that does not rely on courts for social change).

67 This is the model of "provisional adjudication" that Michael Doff advocates to encourage such "democratic experimentalism" in legislatures. Dorf, supra note 11, at 59-69
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitutionof
DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998); see also Becker, supranote 59, at
986-92, 1047-50 (advocating experimentation and the elimination ofjudicial review).
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must be reconstructed to reflect the needs and values of both sexes,
change must be sought from legislatures rather than the courts." 68
Thus, given the value of a model of "democratic experimentalism" for attempting to secure freedom and equality, I argue that one
dimension of government's formative project should be to address the
obstacles to political participation and participation in public conversation that women and men face. A more complete account must
look at the intersection of sex with race and class, because this intersection reveals significant differentials concerning African Americans'
forms and rates of civic and political participation, which may indicate
the role that mistrust of and cynicism toward government as well as
poverty, play.69 When considering the scope of a formative project, I
find instructive models of deliberative democracy and of civil society
that stress the importance of participation in multiple and interlocking public conversations. These models recognize the necessary space
for "counterpublics" or "deliberative enclaves" of resistance, in which
losers in democracies "recognize and fight the ongoing injustice of
their procedures and their outcomes." 70 The possibility of this kind of
social critique and transformation, whether through politics or other
71
forms of collective action, is of vital importance to securing equality.
One core component of a formative project should therefore be the
fostering of persons' capacities to participate in deliberative
democracy.
Another instructive source to help determine the proper aims
and contours of a formative project is the feminist critique that current law and legal theory fail to recognize and protect against genderspecific harms-harms that women exclusively or disproportionately
suffer. This critique also alleges that the law may in certain ways even
legitimize and perpetuate those harms. Robin West argues that one
68 Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Cisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, in FEMINIST LFcAL THEORY 15, 15 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds.,
1991).

69

See Fredrick C. Harris, Will the CircleBe Unbroken?, in CIVIL SocIrT, DEMOCRACY, AISID

Cmc RENEWAL 317 (Robert K.Fullinwider ed., 1999); Jane Junn, Assimilating or Coloring
Participation? Gender, Race, and Democratic PoliticalParticipation, in WOMEN TRANSFORMING
PoLrrcs 387 (CathyJ. Cohen et al. eds., 1997). Studies also indicate the comparative absence of the voices of less advantaged groups in public conversation. See SIDNEY VERBA ET
At., VoIcE AND EQuA=rr 228-66 (1995).
70 Jane Mansbridge, UsingPower/FightingPower: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 46, 55-58 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). For helpful models along these lines, see
NANCY FRASER, JusTICE INTERRuPTus 69-98 (1997); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative
Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra, at 67. I discuss the
relevance of these models to a conception of civil society in McClain & Fleming, supra note
15.
71 See Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CH.-KNr L
Rav. 477, 479 (2000) (arguing that Constitution has a core commitment to "multiple repositories of power," which requires that both power and its challengers be fractured and
relegated to different modes of collective action).
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reason for this failure is that mainstream legal and political thought
assumes and values an atomistic and fundamentally separate self, a
view that reflects men's experience; in contrast, the concept of connection is central to women's lives and values. The law, West contends, fails both to value and protect good forms of connection, and
to protect against harmful forms of connection. She urges a shift to
an instrumentalist jurisprudence, or a feminist instrumentalism,
which would understand law as fundamentally an instrument
"designed to minimize the harms we suffer in social life" 72 and would
use law to advance the goal of creating a legal world in which the
harms that women suffer are taken as seriously as those that men suffer. 73 Examining the relationship between law and gender-specific

harms, West finds that the law is far from being instrumentalist in the
way that she advocates, but instead perpetuates such harms in various
ways. These ways include: partial regulation of gendered harms, leaving a good deal of the problem unaddressed; nonrecognition of
gendered harms; legitimization of gender-specific harms; protection
of the harm through protection of the conduct causing the harm; and
the mandating of harm by punishing attempts by women to circumvent it

74

West's constitutional theory is a "progressive constitutionalism."
She calls for affirmative legislative responsibility to attack such
problems as unjust hierarchies of private power that constrain persons' meaningful liberty and equality. 75 This progressive constitutionalism targets not only barriers to women's ability to live good lives, but
many forms of unjust private power such as racism and homophobia.
Feminist and critical race scholar Dorothy Roberts endorses West's affirmative ideal of liberty and its facilitative role for the state, but would
expand this ideal by explicitly focusing on the link between liberty
and racial equality and by putting race at the center stage of public
deliberation over issues crucial to women's well-being. 76 Linking
West's constitutional project to her call for an instrumentalistjurisprudence that centers on harm, West clearly signals that a vital project for
legal theorists should be developing an adequate phenomenological
account both of women's and men's lives and of the way in which
72

ROBIN WEST, CARING FORJUSTCE 94-95 (1997).

See id. at 174-78. In focusing upon both the value and the danger of connection,
West views her project as synthesizing key insights of relational feminism (inspired espe73

cially by CAROL GILLGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoICE (1982)) and radical, or dominance, femi-

nism. See id. at 7-9. According to West, instrumentalism is the language of legal reform,
and thus feminists need to reinvigorate traditional instrumentalism by questioning its underlying assumptions (particularly its tendency to accept notions of economic, self-interested man and the central importance of narrowly conceived, cost-benefit analysis). See id.
74 See id. at 138-64.
75
See ROBIN Whsr, PROGRESSIVE CONSTTUONALISM 1-6 (1994).
76 See DoRoTHY ROBERTS, KILLrNG THE BLAcK BODY 309-11 (1997).
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various forms of private power hinder a person's ability to live a meaningfully autonomous life.
A striking aspect of West's argument is the extent to which she
regards a self-governing life as a good life and uses a liberal model of
self 7 as the benchmark against which to indict the injustice of the

lack of autonomy in women's lives. 78 West's ideal self, which I have
called the "choosing, caring self,"79 seems to be a hybrid of liberal and
relational feminist ideals. Regardless of the definition, her turn to
liberalism suggests that the problem is not that the liberal ideal of an
autonomous self is hopelessly inapt as a model of "real life," but rather
that society should strive to close the gap between the ideal and the
empirical reality of most women's lives. I endorse this move as an
important component of a formative project to secure equality as well
as liberty.
What is the mix of empirical and normative claims in West's approach? Notwithstanding feminist suspicion of grand theory,8 0 West
herself is an unabashed grand theorist. Her own phenomenology of
women's lives, although rich and provocative, is more impressionistic
and interpretive than truly empirical in the sense of being grounded
in statistics and social science. Undoubtedly, some narratives of women's lives, including those drawn from literature and social science,
undergird some of her most sweeping claims about the gendered
harms that most women suffer.8 1 However, as I have argued elsewhere, a finer-grained analysis is necessary. Her work could benefit
from more carefully engaging antiessentialist feminists' cautions that,
given the complexity of women's experiences and their many varied
or salient differences, claims about women as women should be provisional, contextual, and qualified.8 2 Additionally, West's monolithic account of how culture and law shape women should cede to a more
nuanced theory that allows for how women shape culture, even as they
are shaped by it, and that recognizes the possibility of transformation
77 By using this phrase, I mean a model of self that regards persons as having certain
capacities or moral powers, including the capacity to form, act upon, and revise a concep-

tion of the good.
78
Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of RelationalFeminism: Robin West's Caring for
Justice, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 477, 480 (1999) (book review).
79 Id. at 485-86.
80 For example, consider Martha Fineman's plea for an approach to feminist legal
thought that strikes a balance "between the extremes of 'grand theory' . . . and personal
narratives." Martha L. Fineman, ChallengingLaw, EstablishingDifferences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. Rxv. 25, 25 (1990).
81 West does cite to studies of women's fear of rape. See WEsr, supranote 72, at 101.
Moreover, she invokes Susan Glaspell's A Jury of Her Peers to illustrate her claims about
marriage. See id. at 242-58.
82
See McClain, supranote 78, at 480-81. In my review, I illustrate this argument with
respect to West's claims concerning women's experiences of gender-based harms in marriage. See i&at 497-511.
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within law and culture. A nuanced theory could also attend to how
gender as a system establishes and polices both female and male identity and could expand its focus to harms that boys and men suffer
83

under such a system.
Regardless of whether or not West herself has undertaken the
kind of empirical work that her project demands, she usefully suggests
that legal theory, including constitutional theory, should consider empirical questions such as what harms persons suffer, how such harms
hinder living a good or meaningfully autonomous life, and whether
existing law, including constitutional law, perpetuates, legitimizes, or
redresses such harms. While West focuses upon harms, I believe that
another promising approach, which might facilitate greater attention
to context and differences among persons, can be drawn from the
human capabilities literature. This literature seeks to identify important 1uman capabilities that allow persons to achieve certain "functionings" that they have "reason to value." 84 From this step one can
85
Usargue that a good society should foster such human capabilities.
ing the capabilities approach, one can identify forms of group-based
inequality-class, gender, or race-that are manifest in inequalities of
capabilities and of freedoms and argue that a good society, committed
to fostering human capabilities, may need to make special efforts to
address such inequalities.8 6 Interpretive and normative questions inevitably follow whichever approach one takes. These queries include
determining what theories of the Constitution support a formative
project aimed both at addressing such harms or various forms of unjust private power and social hierarchies, and at fostering those
human capabilities required to live good or meaningfully autonomous
lives.
C.

Feminist Critiques of Constitutional Democracy's Liberal Self

The third and final feminist attack on constitutional theory's lack
of empiricism targets the limits of liberal models of constitutional de83
For helpful feminist work recognizing this point, see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Genderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1 (1995) and Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong wdth Sexual
Harassment?,49 STAN. L. Rzv. 691 (1997). Notably, in recent years psychologist Carol Gilligan has begun looking at the harms that boys suffer due to socialization in masculinity. See
Carey Goldberg, After Girls Get the Attention, Focus Shifts to Boys' Woes, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23,
1998, at Al (discussing Gilligan's research).
84 AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALry REEXAMINED 4-5 (1992).
85 Amartya Sen has taken and Martha Nussbaum has elaborated on this pioneering
approach to human development. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 84; THE QUALrIy OF LIUE
(Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
86 See SEN, supra note 84, at 117-28, 141-43. For an examination of sex inequality
using the human-capabilities approach, see WOMEN, CuLTuRE AND DEVELOPMENT (Martha
C. Nussbaum &Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
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mocracy. I include this argument for its guidance concerning the
proper scope of a formative project to secure freedom and equality.
In her article, Democracy and Feminism, Tracy Higgins echoes familiar
feminist criticisms of liberal constitutionalism.8 7 These critics are opposed to the theory that posits an autonomous self and that assumes
that constitutional rights, conceived of as negative liberties, permit the
autonomous self to be self-governing and protect it against intrusive
majoritarian action.8 8 Higgins pursues these themes and attempts to
show how they translate into inadequate conceptions of constitutional
democracy.8 9 In her view, liberal constitutionalism suggests that autonomous beings come to politics to vote their fully formed prefer-ences, while what is truly needed is a "recursive" model of politics that
is cognizant of the crucial role that participation in democratic selfgovernment should play in helping women to fashion their desires
and perfect their lives.9 0 Women differ from the autonomous liberal
self because of the combined effects of unjust private power, gender
socialization and false consciousness, and similar influences.
In this respect, Higgins faults Justices Ginsburg and Scalia in the
VA! case 9 ' for taking as given women's preferences concerning the
desirability of attending all-male military academies or of keeping
these institutions all male. 92 She also criticizes the Justices for ac-

cepting these preferences as reflecting women's agency and for failing
to examine the construction of such preferences. 93 Higgins uses the
term "agency" instead of "autonomy" to allude to the feminist claim
that the liberal focus on autonomy obscures the issues of unequal
power rooted in sex inequality and of the preconditions that must be
met for women to have the capacity to act in the world as self-governing agents. 94 Conceiving constitutional rights as primarily negative
liberties against the state distracts attention from the fact that women
must enlist the state to help attain equality and good lives.
As stated elsewhere, although I disagree with her assessment of
liberalism and of negative liberty, I agree with Higgins and a broad
array of legal scholars and political philosophers who argue that affirmative governmental action is an important element in securing
equality and self-government. 9 5 Proponents of a formative project
87

Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARv. L.

88
89

See id. at 1660-61.
See id.

REv.

1657 (1997).

90
See id. at 1700-03. Elsewhere, I explore more fully this form of feminist perfectionism and its critique of liberalism. See McClain, supra note 2, at 36-39, 106-31.
91 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996); id. at 588-89 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
92

See Higgins, supra note 87, at 1667-69.

93

See id. at 1667-70.
See id. at 1664 n.31.
See McClain, supra note 2, at 36-39, 75-76, 106-31.

94
95
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must face difficult questions concerning how to foster human capacity
or capability without veering too closely to a strong form of perfectionism that enlists government to enforce one conception of the
good life. Consequently, Higgins herself recognizes, but does not attempt to resolve, a number of difficult empirical and normative issues
raised by her proposed model of constitutionalism. That model
would impose judicial and legislative obligations to advance a substantive principle of sex equality, including legislative efforts to shape women's preferences and choices to counter the effects of sex
inequality. 96 These issues include, for example, whose conception of
a good life prevails, what happens if women disagree about the meaning of sex equality, and what are the proper means by which to secure
equality.97 This project itself rests upon a normative conception of
the aims of constitutional law and theory, and of the role of government in fostering sex equality and promoting women's agency.
II
DOES THE

CONSTITUTION

A FORMATrvE

AUTHORIZE

PROJECT?

All the feminist critiques discussed above suggest the importance
of attention to the preconditions for responsible and meaningful
democratic and personal self-government. Social constructionists
might describe such a formative project as one that affords persons
the material and cultural resources to participate in the dialectic of
self- and cultural-construction. 98 Liberals inspired by Rawls's political
liberalism might characterize it more in terms of securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. 9 9 Alternatively, deliberative democrats who embrace discourse-ethics
models might speak in terms of the requirements of norms of universal moral respect and reciprocity and of an institutional design that
allows for "a multiple, anonymous, heterogeneous network of many
publics and public conversations." 10 0
My own view is that a valuable starting point for a formative project, which resonates with diverse approaches, is the focus upon fostering human capacities and specifically the capacities to direct one's life
in a meaningful sense and to participate in society. Another useful
point of common ground is the recognition that the self is socially
situated and that social structures or institutions may thus play a form96 See Higgins, supra note 87, at 1700.
97 See id. I examine some of these problems with perfectionism in McClain, supra
note 2, at 124-31.
98 See, e.g., NancyJ. Hirschmann, Toward a Feminist Theory ofFreedom, 24 POL. THEORY
46 (1996).
99
SeeJames E. Fleming, SecuringDeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1995).
100 Benhabib, supra note 70, at 87.
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ative role in both constraining and enabling self-government and
choice. To this core, I would add both the need to focus more explicitly on human interdependency (as I discuss in Part I) and on
problems posed by entrenched inequality. Working out a formative
project would build on this core.
However, even if one could learn about the varieties of factors
that help people become moral agents and act efficaciously in the
world, and the factors that impair their capacity to do so, how would
this information relate to the goals of constitutional theory? How
does the concern for fostering human capacity map onto the concers of constitutionalism? Does the Constitution authorize a formative project? The extent to which the constitutional text, history, and
structure bar, permit, or even require such a project is a question of
constitutional interpretation.
One could posit that our constitutional order presumes that citizens have the capacities to engage in responsible self-government and
in social reproduction. 10 1 Some communitarians and civic republicans contend that the Framers assumed that the institutions of civil
society would foster those capacities and thus did not set up, as a part
of the constitutional structure, a governmental formative project to
create responsible citizens. As I discuss elsewhere, some scholars
claim that liberal democracy depends upon civil society for orderly
social reproduction, but that liberalism may be "lethal" to the "seedbeds of [civic] virtue," because its commitment to values such as toleration slides too easily into a neutrality that bars government from
actively securing the conditions for ordered liberty: a virtuous, responsible, informed, and active citizenry.10 2 As I have written elsewhere, I
reject this interpretation of the principle of toleration' 0 3 and I agree
with accounts of "civic liberalism," which argue that government has a
proper role to play in fostering civic virtue, or "the capacities and dispositions conducive to thoughtful participation in the activities of
modem politics and civil society,"' 0 4 and supporting public values.
101 SeeJoHN RAWLS, PoLmIcAL LIBERALISM 19, 103-04 (1993) (ascribing to persons, as
citizens, "two moral powers": "acapacity for a sense ofjustice and for a conception of the
good"); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 788 (1997)
(discussing the role of the family in "the orderly production and reproduction of society
and its culture from one generation to the next").
102

McClain & Fleming, supranote 15, at 306 (discussing SEEDBEDS OF VmTUE: SouRcEs
& David

OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERIcA (Mary Ann Glendon

Blankenhom eds., 1995)); see also MARYANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 109-20 (1991) (asserting that "individual freedom and the general welfare alike depend on the condition of the
fine texture of civil society").
103 See McClain, supra note 2.
104 STEPHEN MACEDO, DrvEsrrv AND DISTRusT 10 (2000) (arguing for a "civic
liberalism").
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Some avenues of constitutional interpretation offer promising
justifications for a governmental formative project. West's "progressive constitutionalism" interprets the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to place an affirmative responsibility on Congress to
attack unjust hierarchies and abusive private power in order to foster
"meaningfully free and autonomous" lives. 10 5 Frank Michelman identifies in the late Justice Brennan's jurisprudence a "romantic" liberalism, a commitment to respect for individual human personality and
to the value of the capacity for self-revision, which would support constitutional arrangements that foster such capacity and that remedy historically entrenched inequalities. 0 6 Sotirios Barber looks to the ends
listed in the Preamble of the Constitution, such as "promote the general welfare" and "secure the blessings of liberty," and states that
"[a]spirational theorists ask how best to pursue the general welfare
and other constitutional ends under existing and likely
107
circumstances."
The civic republican tradition also provides some rich arguments
concerning the importance of securing citizens' independence and of
viewing property as properly regulated in order to further good public
order. 0 8 Indeed, in a provocative new article about the constitutional
legacy of the New Deal, William Forbath seeks to retrieve "the social
citizenship tradition" of constitutional interpretation, whereby republican concerns over the political economy of citizenship target class
inequality and would support interpreting equal citizenship as entailing a right to "decent work."' 0 9
I am interested in how these various forms of aspirational constitutional theory justify governmental responsibility to engage in a
formative project. This project should address, among other things,
the salient problems of sex inequality that the feminist critiques described above raise, as well as other forms of inequality. Assuming
that these arguments do provide support for a formative project, important empirical questions should guide it. Some of those questions
appear at the beginning of this Article, such as what are the preconditions for democratic and personal self-government, and how may gov105

106

WEST, supra note 75, at 267.
FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN

AND DEMOCRACY

68-72, 119-33 (1999).

Sotirios A. Barber, How Empirical Must Constitutional Theory Be? 3 (Dec. 5-6,
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For a fuller account of this argument, see SoruRIos A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONS'rruTON MEANS (1984). Similarly,
Mark Tushnet views the principles of the Declaration of Independence, as well as the Preamble, as the basis for America's commitments to equality and basic liberties, and argues
for taking the Constitution away from the courts in order to realize those principles
through populist constitutional law. See TusHNr, supra note 66, passim
107

108

See, e.g.,

GRFoRY

S.

ALEXANDER, COMMODrrY

& PROPRIETY 21-71 (1997).

109 William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1, 1-7
(1999).
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emiment best aim to secure them. 1 0 The feminist critiques described
above also suggest relevant empirical questions concerning the conceptions of autonomy at work in constitutional justifications for liberty, or decisional autonomy, and for freedom of association.
Feminist critiques about how private power constrains the enjoyment
of constitutional rights also raise empirical questions, as do charges
that formal rights are meaningless without the material preconditions
to exercise and enjoy them.
Along these lines, unanswered questions exist about the constitutionally permitted parameters of governmental regulation to address
barriers to free and equal citizenship resulting from unjust status hierarchies, residual effects of legally sanctioned discrimination, or abuses
of "private" power. Congress has in the past acted to bar discrimination by passing civil rights statutes, and those legislative measures have
survived constitutional challenge."' Similarly, state and local antidiscrimination laws have survived challenges rooted in the First Amend2
ment's freedom of association."
More recently, in the face of constitutional challenges to the civil
rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),13
some legal scholars have argued that VAWA was a proper exercise of
Congress's power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Four4
teenth Amendment and secure the equal citizenship of women,"1
although Congress officially placed more reliance upon its authority
to regulate commerce. Moreover, as federal courts upholding VAWA
have pointed out, VAWA's enactment followed years of congressional
testimony or "facts" concerning the detrimental impact of violence

110 See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
111 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the Voting
Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
112 See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (upholding the Minnesota
Human Rights Act).
113 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
114 See Brief of Law Professors as Amid Curiae in Support of Petitioners, United States
v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422 (May 15, 2000). I was a signatory to
the cited brief. One of the arguments made in the cited brief is that the civil rights remedy
was appropriate because "Congress found pervasive and entrenched patterns of sex discrimination in state criminal justice systems" with respect to crimes of violence disproportionately affecting women-a finding supported by numerous state gender-bias task forces
and by the testimony of various state attorneys' general. Id. at 18-23 (typeface altered).
But it should be noted that one prominent law professor, Richard Epstein, co-authored an
amicus curiae brief registering a dissenting view. See Brief of the Institute for Justice and
the Cato Institute as Amid Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422 (May 15, 2000) (arguing that VAWA "is not an
appropriate exercise of Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment").
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against women on their ability to participate in society.'1 5 And most
states not only supported Congress's enactment of VAWA, but gave
testimony as to the inadequacy of their criminal justice systems to
remedy this problem, due in part to patterns of gender bias and discrimination." 6 One might have thought that the Court's earlier ability to consider "facts" concerning violence in women's lives, such as
the Court's striking down of the husband-notification provision in
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey," 7 would help it to give weight to such empirical findings as it determined the constitutionality of VAWA during
this term.
The Court's decision striking down the civil rights remedy of
VAWA bodes ill for interpretation of the Constitution as a source for
securing, rather than hindering, women's equality. It also portends
interpretation of principles of federalism and state action so as to suggest that gender-motivated violence is not a matter bearing on women's national citizenship. 118 Indeed, writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated: "The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local," thus confining
"the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims" to the
police power of the state," 9 and seemingly missing, if not denying,
115
See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 911-17
(4th Cir. 1999) (MotzJ., dissenting) (describing congressional findings and testimony supporting VAWA as "detailed and extensive" and noting that every other federal court to
consider the question had concluded that Congress's findings support the constitutionality
of VAWA), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422
(May 15, 2000). But see id. at 889 (en banc) (holding that neither the Commerce Clause
nor § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress's civil rights remedy in

VAWA).
116 See id. at 931 (Motz, J., dissenting) (drawing on state testimony to argue for appropriateness of such federal efforts as enacting VAWA); Brief of the States of Arizona [, 35
other states, and Puerto Rico] as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners' Brief on the
Merits at 14, United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422 (May 15,
2000) (arguing for the appropriateness of VAWA's civil rights remedy in light of the "substantial evidence" before Congress that "the states' own efforts to combat gender-motivated
violence have been inadequate" (typeface altered)). But see Brief for the State of Alabama
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at *17-19, United States v. Morrison, Nos. 995, 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422 (May 15, 2000) (opposing VAWA's civil rights remedy as
creating "a national tort remedy for private acts of gender-motivated violence" and disputing that the record supports any claim that states have violated the constitutional rights of
their citizens (typeface altered)); Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, United States v. Morrison, Nos.
99-5, 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422 (May 15, 2000) (arguing that "unproven blanket assertions" about gender bias do not establish state action).
117 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (striking down the husband-notification
provision in a Pennsylvania abortion statute).
118 See Siegel, supra note 52, at 2196-2207 (discussing federalism objections to VAWA
and the implication that domestic violence is a state, rather than national, concern).
119 United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422, *33 (May 15,

2000).
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any connection between violence against women and women's status
as equal citizens under the federal Constitution.
This stunningly truncated view of congressional authority with respect to civil rights and of what matters are of "truly national" concern
seems to confirm feminists' worst fears that the Constitution (at least
as interpreted by the courts) too often hinders, rather than fosters,
women's equality, in this instance under the guise of concern for federalism. However, it should be noted that the Court was closely divided, and that the dissenters strenuously and cogently rejected, as an
unsound "categorical formalism," the Court's approach to Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause, which attempted to delineate
"the local" from "the national," rather than to recognize the inevitable
role of politics in mediating such a line. 20 Moreover, the dissenters
took exception to the majority's characterization of the factual findings about the impact of violence against women and suggested that
the legislative record was "far more voluminous" than the record compiled by Congress and found sufficient in upholding Title II of the
12 1
Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Commerce Clause challenges.
What the opinion may also reveal is "the unfortunate consequence of
a series of political decisions harking back to Reconstruction," which
required Congress to rely on the Commerce Clause rather than on its
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 12 2 or even to give effect
to the Thirteenth Amendment. 123 Nonetheless, one can find examples of apparently constitutional governmental regulations that address some of the obstacles to responsible citizenship and, in that
sense, engage in a formative project. Additionally, to the extent that
Congress or state legislatures do so, they may afford an example of
124
enforcement of the Constitution outside the courts.
I believe that an inevitable movement occurs between normative
and empirical constitutional questions. Consider, for example, the

Id. at *77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at *60.
122 Jack M. Balkin, The Court Defers to a Racist Era, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at A27.
123 Some scholars argue that the Reconstruction Amendments arose out of this country's experience with the moral slavery and social death that were incidents of slavery; they
have interpreted those amendments as measures designed to confer moral agency and to
remedy the abridgement of basic human rights of enslaved persons, such as the rights of
conscience, intimate life, and speech. See DAvis, supra note 14, at 9-10; DAVID AJ. RICH120
121

ARDs, WOMEN, GAs, AND THE CONSTTrrION 200-08 (1998). Analogous arguments could

speak of how "private," gender-motivated violence impairs women's moral agency and
abridges their exercise of constitutional rights, a problem made worse by gender bias in
the criminal justice system.
124 See SUrNSraN, supra note 13, at 9-10; TusHmr, supra note 66, at 33-53; Lawrence
Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv.L.
REv. 1212, 1239-42 (1978).
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functions and proper regulation of civil society.' 25 Suppose that girls
reared in fundamentalist religious households in which a traditional-and in feminist terms, unjust-gendered division of labor
exists are socialized into a worldview that holds that the proper role
for girls is to become obedient wives and mothers.' 26 Will this scenario leave those girls with a diminished capacity for self-government
and a constricted sense of self, both of which will have an impact on
their later "choices"? If so, would this empirical fact justify governmental measures to discourage or even prohibit this gendered division of labor and socialization, notwithstanding the principle of
religious toleration? 12 7 Taking either of these steps would require a
normative argument about balancing freedom of religion, freedom of
association, and parental liberty against the government's interest in
attacking sex inequality, fostering women's equal citizenship, and preparing children for citizenship by inculcating in them the capacity for
128
critical, reflective thought.
Suppose one accepts the claim that "the justification for some
measure of public authority" concerning children lies in the "basic
fact" that "children are not simply creatures of their parents," but are
"independent persons-in-the-making with their own basic interests
and their own lives to lead," and that government and a democratic
1 29
community should insist on "due regard" for that independence.
125
A symposium, of which I am a co-editor with James Fleming, explores these questions. See Symposium, Legal and ConstitutionalImplications of the Calls to Revive Civil Society,
75 Cm.-KENr L. Rxv. 289 (2000). In her recent book, political scientist Nancy Rosenblum
conducted an empirical investigation of associations, studying them both in the context of
constitutionaIjustifications for freedom of association and liberal anxiety about whether or
not such associations contribute to democratic self-government. See NANcY L. ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHiP AND MoRALs (1998). She concludes that they contribute only indirectly toward democratic self-government but serve important functions with respect to personal
self-government. See id. at 349-51.
See, e.g., Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 27, 2000, § 6 (Maga126
zine), at 34, 68 (reporting in-depth on a fundamentalist family).
127 Such measures might range from the outright prohibition of such a division, to
linking marriage licenses to state counseling that urges an equal division of labor, to tax
incentives and penalties, to public education campaigns.
128
One learns from the cases involving the scope of parents' constitutional rights to
shape their children's education both that children are not wards of the state, but are
entrusted primarily to the authority and guidance of their parents, see, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and that government may do a great deal to shape children
into patriotic, responsible citizens. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 640 (1943) ("National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion
and example is not in question."); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 ("That the State may do much, go
very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected."). Elsewhere, I discuss the constitutional significance of the distinction between
governmental coercion and governmental persuasion in the promotion of its ends. See
McClain, supra note 2, at 42-65.
129
MACEDO, supra note 104, at 233, 243 (discussing justification for public schools).
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Further empirical questions would arise, such as whether government
can counter the effects of gender socialization short of intervening in
the family form itself, through measures such as vigorous enforcement
of equal-opportunity and antidiscrimination laws and liberal and feminist civic education. For example, could injecting messages about sex
equality and girls' range of choices into the school curriculum help?
Or would parents, faced with such a curriculum, choose private
schools or home schooling?13 0 What are the likely costs to the family
of governmental regulation or of such civic education? And even assuming a legislative body committed to a principle of sex equality
within the home, is there a clear content for an optimal, equal, or
minimally "just" division of household labor? This Article raises these
difficult questions without answering them in order to illustrate the
complexity of the work involved in considering the contours of affirm131
ative governmental responsibility to address sex inequality.
III
PuBLIc

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MATERIAL PREcoNDrnONS
FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

One important dimension of a formative project is public responsibility to help members of society secure the resources or material
preconditions for a good, self-governing life. Claims concerning how
sex inequality-and other forms of inequality-shape preferences and
cast doubt on supposed liberal assumptions about autonomy and
choice are well-traveled feminist territory. 3 2 An equally important issue warranting feminist attention is the issue of growing economic inequality and government's responsibility to address this inequality and
provide the economic preconditions for democratic and personal selfgovernment. 133 This economic inequality is a serious obstacle to self130 See Talbot, supra note 126, at 34 (reporting that "[o] nly 6 percent of conversative
Christians educate their children at home,..., though the numbers are growing," and that
the trend among fundamentalist Christians is to retreat from, or "'quarantine themselves'"
from the "majority culture" and shelter their children from outside influences).
131 For a brief description of my own approach, see McClain, supra note 2. For two
instructive and contrasting liberal feminist perspectives, compare Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHics 23 (1994) (critiquing John Rawls's Political
Liberalism), with S.A. Lloyd, Situatinga Feminist CriticismofJohn Rawls's Political Liberalism,
28 Loy. L. L. REv. 1319 (1995) (evaluating Okin's critique of Rawls). For a debate on
this issue in the context of reconciling commitments to sex equality and to group rights,
see Is MuLTxcULOruasm BAD FOR WOMEN? (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 75-79. For a helpful discussion of this line of
feminist critique, see Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: FeministPerspectives on SelfDirection, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805 (1999).
133 In this Symposium, Angela Harris also urges attention to the economic preconditions for freedom. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: Beyond Equality: Powerand the Possibility of
Freedom in the Republic of Choice, 85 CoRNau. L. Rtv. 1181 (2000). For some helpful feminist
works, see, for example, HARD IAZOR (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999); Dorothy
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government. This Article offers a preliminary comparison of two recent approaches to this topic, one emanating from liberal quarters
and the other from feminist quarters. Juxtaposing these two approaches may illuminate some of the challenges to forging a synthetic,
liberal feminist approach to the issue of government's affirmative responsibility for a formative project. I applaud both of these proposals
for maintaining a fairly robust notion of toleration, or governmental
noninterference with persons living out the lives they think best for
themselves, yet insisting on a strong principle of governmental responsibility to secure the economic preconditions for living such lives.
In their recent book, The Stakeholder Society, Bruce Ackerman and
Anne Alstott propose a solution to increasing inequality and
America's drift away from equality of opportunity. 34 They propose
that each young American, upon reaching adulthood, receive $80,000
as "a stake in his country."'1 35 Their central premise is that such a
stake would further a conception of "economic citizenship" and affirm the liberal principle of equal concern and respect.' 36 Focusing
on young persons on the verge of adulthood, they contend that, regardiless of the economic circumstances of one's parents, "[a] 11 Americans have a fundamental right to a fair share of the nation's resources
1 37
as they accept the full responsibilities of adult life."

Ackerman and Alstott have a self-consciously civic republican vision that links private property ownership and citizenship and holds as
a central value the fostering of persons' independence, which private
property ownership secures, according to republican theory. 138 Their
vision is also liberal because, by their own description, stakeholding is
a practical application of an emerging form of liberalism that does
three things: "(a) takes individualism seriously, (b) recognizes that
each individual's starting point in life is shaped by a confrontation
with his economic and educational opportunities, and therefore (c)
grants the state a potentially constructive role in the just distribution

E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE LJ. 1563 (1996) (book
review) (posing as a dilemma the fact that, while a strong welfare state is required to make
African Americans full participants in the political economy, the refusal of Whites to ex-

tend full citizenship rights to Blacks persistently blocks efforts to establish an inclusive
welfare system). I discuss Martha Fineman's work infra notes 150-63 and accompanying
text.
134

135
136

AcKEP.MAN & ALsroTr, supra note 5.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 8-12.
Id. at 57.

137
138 See id. at 12 ("This is the time to make economic citizenship a central part of the
American agenda... [enabling] allAmericans to enjoy the promise of economic freedom
that our existing property system now offers to an increasingly concentrated elite.").

20001

SECURING FREEDOMAND EQUALUTY

1251

of these opportunities." 3 9 Moreover, this vision is liberal in insisting
that, given that different people will make different choices, it is not
government's business to interfere with how one spends his or her
stake.
The details of Ackerman and Alstott's proposal or its mechanics
are beyond the scope of this Article. But the authors' assumption is
that, in contrast to the many financial constraints that now limit young
persons' options, this stake will help youths to make a wide array of
choices: investing in college or alternative forms of training, forming
families, buying time out of the paid labor market to care for children
(here, the authors' examples most typically are of young mothers),
purchasing first homes, and purchasing education and child care for
their children. 140 The liberal value of choice is an overarching theme
in this proposal. Its centrality is most clearly seen in the way the authors deal with the problem of the "stakeblower"-the person who
makes unwise decisions concerning the use of her stake:
"[S] takeholding means recognition as a real citizen, whose pursuit of
happiness is entitled to respect. Her choices, successes, and failures
14 1
are her own."
Accordingly, government has a limited, if any, continuing responsibility to the stakeblower. Government should certainly take steps to
encourage responsible use of the stake, such as through education, yet
a principle of personal responsibility requires holding persons accountable for their choices. What if, however, gender socialization,
internalized oppression, or similar notions, shape a stakeholder's
choices and lead to unwise choices with dire consequences? From the
outset, the authors make disclaimers that their concern is with economic inequality and "MONEY," and thus the "book does not deal
with the special problems posed by physical or mental handicaps, abusive and inadequate parenting, impoverished and segregated educa142
tion, or pervasive racial and gender discrimination."
Anticipating my discussion of Martha Fineman's work, I suggest
that one should also note that Ackerman and Alstott's stakeholding
vision does not deal with "inevitable dependency" and caretaking. On
this final matter, the stakeholding approach clearly addresses the dilemma of combining domestic and market labor largely through individual solutions made possible by the stake, rather than through
public responsibility and institutional restructuring. A common ex139 Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted). Libertarian objections to this liberal vision undoubtedly exist. See, e.g., RANDY E. BAR~Nrr, THE STRUcruPE OF LmERTY 308-17 (1998) (discussing problems associated with redistribution of benefits).
140
See AcERmAN & Aisrorr, supranote 5, at 65-75.
141
Id at 74; see also id. at 39-41 (arguing that fears of misuse are paternalistic and
overblown).
142
Id. at 25.
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ample they offer is that of a woman who, by means of her stake, can
afford to stay out of the paid labor market in order to take care of her
children. 143 The authors assert that "[iun the short term, stakeholding will enhance the power of women to make the most sensible accommodation to an unjust reality."144 Perhaps in the long term "it
will... convey a symbolic message of support for gender equality" and
"give enterprising women the real resources they need to challenge
traditional expectations and make their own way in the world. " 145 It is
striking that the authors acknowledge the possible feminist criticism
that a woman's choice to buy time out of the paid labor market might
be the result of "false consciousness," but then grant that "deep-seated
gender-role expectations have irrevocably shaped women's (and
men's) ideas about what women should want from life," and also "support educational efforts to challenge these stereotypes."' 46 Their account of liberalism demands, however, that one not "dismiss the
genuinely felt aspirations of today's women as false consciousness" for
"[n] o less than men, they deserve nothing less than the real freedom
47
that stakeholding offers.'
An element of Ackerman and Alstott's provocative proposal that I
wish to embrace is its account of a liberalism that values individual
autonomy while rejecting a presocial self and that affirms some conception of personal responsibility yet insists upon public responsibility-and the role of an activist government-to secure the
preconditions for the exercise of personal responsibility. My own liberal feminist approach diverges from their proposal with respect to
starting points. Their focus on how eighteen-year-olds can achieve independence artificially isolates one dimension of a larger project of
social reproduction that asks many questions: How are persons
formed in those first eighteen years? What educational institutions
and other institutions of civil society may usefully foster that development? What is the proper interplay of familial and public responsibility for such social reproduction? Then moving beyond childhood and
the eighteen-year-old's initial achievement of some economic "independence," what are government's ongoing affirmative obligations to
help shape that person's capacities and to secure the economic, social,
and legal preconditions necessary for that person to live a good, selfgoverning life?
Understandably, Ackerman and Alstott attempt to isolate what
they believe to be the most important component in a reconceptual143
144
145
146

147

See id. at 69-70.
Id. at 208.

Id.
Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.

2000]

SECURING FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

1253

ized post-welfare state. However, the human-capabilities approach
teaches us that simply giving persons the same economic resource will
not guarantee equality, because differences rooted in poverty and racism among persons will affect their ability to utilize those resources. 1 48 Although the republican tradition that "private property

secures independence and citizenship" is one useful resource in conceptualizing public responsibility, this notion is problematic without a
careful reconstruction of the idea of independence and of its assumptions concerning gender and citizenship. 149
Engaging in this reconstructive work, Martha Fineman undertakes an ambitious program of subjecting such core "foundational
myths" as independence, autonomy, and self-sufficiency to critical reevaluation.15 0 Her basic premise is that society has used the family as
the primary unit of responsibility for meeting dependency problems,
but that this approach is inadequate. The family caretaking work performed largely by women is a subsidy which benefits not just the recipients of this care, but all of society. I believe that key liberal accounts
such as those ofJohn Rawls' 5 1 and Susan Moller Okin' 52 would readily
concur with Fineman on this point, because the family does vital work
to preserve society or social reproduction: nurturing, providing for,
and shaping persons who will be future citizens and members of society. This labor is, or should be, a public value of great importance,
and yet society does not affirmatively support this caretaking work. As
Fineman elaborates more fully in her book, The Neutered Mother, all
human beings are dependent at some points in their lives; at a minimum as children and, often, in old age.15 3 This "inevitable dependency," is rooted in a biological universal. 5 4 When persons meet the
needs of this dependency, they require resources to do so and thus
experience "derivative dependency." 55 By privatizing responsibility
to meet inevitable dependency and by failing to acknowledge collec148

See SEN, supra note 84, at 120-22.

149

In his otherwise illuminating account of the history of the notion of the political

economy of citizenship in the republican tradition, Michael Sandel repeatedly notes the
emphasis upon securing the independence of the working man or shoring up manhood,
without focusing upon concurrent assumptions about women's roles and needs or on the

problem of inevitable dependency. See SANDEL, supra note 1 passim. Joan Williams, however, attempts to combine civic republican notions of redistribution with feminist concerns
for reconstructing gender. SeejoAN WILUiAMs, Unbending Gender (2000).
150 Professor Fineman's reconstructive work is captured in several recent articles. See
supra note 6.

151

See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 101, at 787-94.
See, e.g., SusAN MOLLER OiKN, JUsTIcE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).
153
See FnqmAN, supra note 6, at 161-64.
154 Id. at 161-62.
155
Id. at 162. Fineman notes that, in American society, this group of caretakers consists largely of women. See id.
152
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tive responsibility to meet derivative dependency, society extracts an
unfair and unacknowledged subsidy from caregivers.
Fineman's proposed reforms stem from recognizing this subsidy.
She supports governmental and institutional reform to allow
caregivers to combine market and family labor. 5 6 Fineman also argues that serious and sustained national public conversation should
occur about questions such as the following: "[hiow should the need
for resources for caretaking be satisfied so caretakers can act independently, make decisions and fulfil societal expectations in ways that best
respond to their individual circumstances?," "[i] s it fair that the market and the state (which are totally dependent on caretaking labor
and in no way self-sufficient or independent from caretaking) escape
responsibility for dependency-continue to be freeloaders (or free
riders) on the backs of caretakers and families?," or "Isn't it time to
redistribute some responsibility for dependency, mandating that state
and market bear their fair share of the burden?" 157 A redefinition of
independence and self-sufficiency might emerge from such a public
conversation.
Fineman's starting point of dependency and caregiving usefully
suggests the limits of a stakeholding approach principally aimed at
independence. Fineman offers the following account of
independence:
Independence is gained when an individual has the basic resources
that enable her or him to act consistent with the tasks and expectations imposed by the society. This form of independence should be
every citizen's birthright, but independence in this sense can only
be achieved when individual choices are relatively unconstrained by
inequalities, particularly those that arise from poverty. Independence, as well as justice, requires that those who are assigned a vital
societal function are also provided with the wherewithal to do those
tasks. 158

It is encouraging that Ackerman and Alstott's liberal approach, and
Fineman's feminist approach converge on the constraining effects of
156
See id. at 230-33. Nancy Fraser similarly argues for "a universal caregiver model,"
which would embrace a principle of gender equity and aim "to make women's current lifepatterns the norm for everyone." FRASER, supra note 70, at 59-61. Fraser contends: "Women today often combine breadwinning and caregiving, albeit with great difficulty and
strain. A postindustrial welfare state must ensure that men do the same, while redesigning
institutions so as to eliminate the difficulty and strain." Id. at 61.
157
Fineman, FoundationalMyths, supranote 6, at 25. In a thoughtful new book arguing
for care as a core liberal political value, Mona Harrington similarly calls for a "new politics
of conversation" to address "the care crisis," which would get "a wide range of disparate
groups talking-to each other," to show "that the crisis affects everyone, although in different
ways" and to "produce broad-based support for policies that take those differences into
account." MONA HARRiNGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY 176-81 (1999).
158 Fineman, FoundationalMyths, supra note 6, at 25-26.
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poverty and economic inequality, as well as on some principle of public responsibility.
Another ambitious component of Fineman's approach, which the
stakeholder approach parallels, is its incorporation of a robust notion
of governmental noninterference with a person's living out a self-defined conception of a good life. Fineman approaches this issue with
her appeal for "privacy" for the family, reworking existing norms of
constitutional privacy to recognize the importance of autonomy for
the family unit. Her affirmative vision for families is privacy and subsidy, or, as she describes it, "collective responsibility" without "collective control." 15 9
As a preliminary disclaimer, I concur with Fineman's affirmative
vision that the state should not seek to standardize families or to impose one model-the heterosexual nuclear family, for example-as
the proper family while viewing all others as deviant. Important work
by feminist legal theorists, especially critical race feminists like Peggy
Davis and Dorothy Roberts, makes clear the legacy of institutional racism's disrespect for the African-American family and for the privacy
and autonomy rights of its members. That experience counsels keen
attention to whether and how racism continues to shape the regulation of African-American families through supposedly race-neutral
policies that disproportionately harm such families. 160 Yet arguments
for subsidy, rooted in the notion that reproduction and caregiving
make a valuable social contribution, appear to invite the very sort of
"quality control" oversight that Fineman seeks to avoid. 161 For instance, Fineman's analogy to the military as an example of subsidized
social contribution is instructive, 162 because the military has extensive
"quality control" over its members' performance, and the military itself is subject to governmental oversight. She recognizes the ongoing
role for abuse and neglect statutes to protect children, but she is trying to secure a space for family self-governance by drawing upon constitutional jurisprudence that assumes that parents do act in the best
163
interests of their children most of the time.
The scope of this Article precludes elaboration of this issue.
However, I would urge an approach that holds firm, as Fineman's
does, to a principle of respect for familial autonomy. The approach
should also recognize that if society embraces public responsibility to
159

Fineman, Family Privacy, supra note 6, at 1210.

See DAvis, supra note 14 (discussing the historical development of family rights);
ROBERTS, supra note 76 (addressing the reproductive rights of Black women).
161 As Nancy Fraser observes, three basic principles for public entitlements exist.need, desert, and citizenship-and each has its own associations and possible consequences. FRAsER, supra note 70, at 49-51.
162
See Fineman, FoundationalMyths, supra note 6, at 19.
163 See Fineman, Family Privacy, supranote 6, at 1221-24.
160
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subsidize caregiving, there is a range of governmental action that falls
short of "control" or "coercion" and that could facilitate and encourage parents and other caregivers in fostering children's capacities. As I have discussed elsewhere, a strong principle of toleration as
respect is consistent with support for a range of governmental actions
that foster important public values while pursuing a formative project
aimed at inculcating the capacities for self-government. Some examples in this context could be public school curricula concerning responsible parenting and child development, adult education,
premarital and prenatal counseling concerning childrearing, funding
for good quality health care, pre-schools and extracurricular activities,
and public education campaigns concerning children's well-being.
Given the tenacious public support for the value of "personal responsibility,"164 the most prudent strategy may be to argue for public responsibility to provide the preconditions for personal (and parental)
responsibility, while also arguing that a principle of toleration of respect will allow a space for its exercise.
Just as the stakeholding approach seems to give central
place to
"choice" and to put issues of dependency and constraint on choice to
the side, so Fineman's emphasis upon caretaking and obligation may
give insufficient attention to the value of choice concerning a wide
range of possible life projects, not all of which may involve caretaking.
Undeniably, caretaking should be afforded a certain primacy due to
its role in social reproduction, but meeting such obligations or even
meeting the range of societal obligations and expectations cannot exhaust the scope of reconstructed independence. Part of an adequate
liberal feminist conception of autonomy is the capacity critically to
choose, assess, and revise our connections and commitments, perhaps
the model of the "choosing, caring self."165 In any event, I would urge
a model of self that is not simply an "encumbered self," lest women's
autonomy be linked solely or predominantly with their societally-expected, if not dictated, caretaking responsibilities. While relations of
dependency are inevitable, and caretaking should be an important
public value and the subject of public responsibility, a full account of
autonomy should treat caretaking as one of many types of activities
that are important to a person living a good life.
164
SeeAndrewJ. Cherlin, I'm O.K., You're Sefishz, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (reporting that, in a New York Times survey asking people to rate 15 values,
"[tihe value rated as 'very important' by the highest percentage of people [97%] was 'being responsible for your own actions'"). Elsewhere, I have criticized some invocations of
the value of personal responsibility. See genera/!y Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible"Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 342 (1996) (analyzing "the rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction [by] elaborating on the cluster of reproductive choices and behaviors that is deemed
'irresponsible'").
165 McClain, supra note 78, at 480.
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In sum, both the stakeholding and the subsidy approach invite
attention to the political economy of citizenship. For the notion of
the political economy of citizenship to be of the greatest use today,
one must expand it to focus on the role played by care in creating
persons capable of self-government and upon the types of resources
necessary to provide care. Using gender as a primary category of analysis, and looking to its intersections with class and race, is a valuable
way to gain this expanded focus. 166 This requires the recognition of
feminist deconstruction of the ideal worker as someone with no childcare responsibilities, thereby implicitly depending upon the off-site,
and thus invisible, domestic labor of women. 167 Feminist reconstructive work calls for bringing that which has been off-site and assumed
to the foreground. The old gendered division of labor, with the male
breadwinner and female homemaker distinction, no longer reflects
most American families, although its legacy remains, in the form of
women's disproportionate responsibility for care giving (and cultural
and institutional pressures to accept such responsibilty) and in the
assumption that families must shoulder the burden of social reproduction without help. If this is so, then a more capacious conception of
the political economy of citizenship should ask what sorts of economic
arrangements allow women and men to meet caretaking responsibilities while participating in other work in ways that foster selfgovernment.
Here, however, we should supplement the republican concern
for fostering self-government to include not only self-government by
adults but also preparing children for self-government. Restated, a
formative project would inquire about what institutional arrangements foster personal and democratic self-government, and would include within this inquiry attention to what institutional arrangements
foster social reproduction. 168 This formative project should also combine a republican concern for creating citizens capable of self-government with a more explicit commitment to protecting a realm of moral
independence, and to providing the resources necessary for the exercise of responsibility.

166 For helpful examples of this feminist work, see Patricia Hill Collins, Gender, Black
Feminism, and Black PoliticalEconomy, ANNAis, ANi. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc., Mar. 2000, at 41;
Georgina Waylen, Gender, Feminism, and PoliticalEconomy, 2 Nav PoL ECON. 205 (1997).
167
For a discussion of the invisible domestic labor of women, see WiLLAms, supranote
149.
168
I am attempting to develop these ideas in another work. See Linda C. McClain, Care
as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 77 CH.-KENr L. REv.
(forthcoming Fall 2001).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to take preliminary steps toward delineating a formative project to foster the capacities of individuals for
democratic and personal self-government, to secure free and equal
citizenship, and to identify normative and constitutional foundations
for governmental responsibility to pursue such a project. An abbreviated tour of salient feminist critiques of several lingering problems of
inequality reveals useful information concerning some of the proper
contours and aims of that project. Some pertain to democratic selfgovernment, or securing effective political participation, while others
address how lingering inequality poses obstacles to personal self-government. In this Article, I have put these issues on the agenda for a
formative project, but leave an account of how such a project should
address those problems for subsequent work.
Although the "empirical turn" in recent legal scholarship is useful to a degree, scholars should decline Posner's invitation to avoid
reasoning or arguing over ends. The "empirical turn," as Posner describesit, may call for doing what "'works,"' but normative principles
and even disagreement over them seem to be indispensable to a determination of "what counts as 'working.'",,69 Similarly, feminist scholars
may endorse the call for greater attention to the consequences of constitutionalism and to more empirical input into adjudication and lawmaking, but should reject as futile and even dangerous the quest for
an empiricism unmoored from normative inquiry and messy moral
disagreement. Questions such as what "facts" matter and to what con°
clusions they point implicate questions of value.17
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Dworkin, supra note 25, at 1735.
See Dorf, supra note 11, at 57.

